Wednesday, September 15, 2010

A New Way Forward??? Part 2

Continuing my analysis of the Afghanistan Study Group's new proposal...

2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.

The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.

This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.

Southern Withdrawl

There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.

The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.

First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.

Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).

Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.

Background on Datta Khel, North Waziristan

From the Longwar Journal (September 15, 2010):

The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.

The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.

Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.

But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.

Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.


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Another Strike at the Haqqani Network

From the AFP (September 15, 2010):

MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.

The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.


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A Death in the Haqqani Family

Seems that the Hellfires are getting closer to their ultimate target.

From the AFP (September 15, 2010):

MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.

A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.

“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.

The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.

He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.

The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.

The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.


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